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UNCONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE 
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS 
Ian Pomplin* 
The Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and 
Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-41, 131 Stat. 
862 (2017) was enacted into law on June 23, 2017, in an effort to 
reform a troubled government agency that has had the media shine 
a spotlight on its abuses and waste. This new law significantly 
lowers the standard of evidence to take adverse actions against 
federal employees at the Department of Veterans Affairs, overrides 
collective bargaining agreements, and greatly shortens notice and 
response time periods that are constitutionally guaranteed. This 
comment will discuss the history of due process in federal 
employment, assess the constitutionality of the new law through 
the Matthews v. Eldridge balancing test, and determine if its 
requirements violate the Due Process Clause. This comment 
suggests that the law is counterproductive, leading to a further 
deterioration of the Department of Veterans A ffairs. Lastly, this 
comment will investigate the challenges involved in working to 
overturn or repeal this law. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals 
is ill equipped lo handle federal employee due process claims. The 
law and others like it have been passed with broad bipartisan 
support, which will make it hard for the legislature to change 
course. 
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Marquette University Law School, May 2019. The author 
would like Lo thank his family for their support during the writing and ewting prncess 
for this comment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On J une 23, 2017, the Department of Veterans Affairs 
Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act of 20171 
(Accountability Act) was enacted into law in an effort to reform 
the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The Department had 
been rocked by recent scandals in 2014 involving government 
employees that had falsified documents, outbreaks of disease, 
long waitlists, and retaliation against whistleblowers.2 An 
accountability bill was soon passed by the House of 
Representatives to combat this scandal, and was targeted at 
senior executives at the V A.3 That law did not end the issues 
plaguing the Agency, and Congress decided that the increased 
accountability needed to be applied to workers that were not 
working in executive positions.1 The 2017 Accountability Act, 
enacted as a remedy, viola tes federal public sector employees' 
constitutionally granted rights. 
II. THE HJ STORY OF FEDERAL PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 
The history of just cause and due'process in the federal civil 
service stems from two places; 1) a series of congressional acts and 
executive orders modifying the acts, and 2) a line of judicial 
precedent in regards to the Fifth Amendment due process clause, 
which states, "No person shall [ ... } be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law''.s The Supreme Court has 
since incorporated the Fifth Amendment due process clause to the 
states; in addition to stating that a public employee has a property 
right in his job,6 so all levels of government need to provide due 
1. Dep't. of Veterans J\IT. Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017, 
Pub. L. No. 115-41, Stat. 862 (2017). 
2. Katiti Zezima, Everything you need to kMw about the VA and the scandals engulfing 
it, '!'HE W ASHING'l'ON PO!."'I' (May 30, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/201~/05/21/a-guide-to-the-va-and-
th e-scandals-cnguJ fing • i U. 
3. Ed O'l<cefc, What is the VA Accountability Act?, T HE WASHING'rON l'OS'r (May 21, 
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2014/05/21/what-is-
thc-va-accoun tability-act/ 
4. Sen. Marco Rubio et al., Commentary: VA bureaucracy continues to protect bad 
employees, hurt U.S. troops, AIR FORCE 'l'I.MP.S: Vls:'l'EIIANS (May J I, 2017), 
https://www.airfo1·cetimes.com/veLcl'ans/2017 /05/ l I /com monlna·y-va -bureaucracy• 
conLinues-Lo-proLect-bod-cmployees-hurt-11-s-LrOOps/. 
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
6. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermil l, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). 
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process before taking significant adverse actions against 
employees. The Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability 
and Whistleblower Protection Act of 20177 violates the Fifth 
Amendment right to due process. 
A. Due Process in Public Employment 
The Civil Service was created in 1883 by the Pendleton Act8, 
which was a replacement to the previous spoils system.9 The 
spoils system was plagued by incompetence and corruption, 
because individuals were selected for govcmmental positions 
based upon political loyalty and not talent. 10 The Pendleton Act 
was passed into law on January 16, 1883, in an attempt to reform 
federal employment by instituting a competitive exam-based 
hiring process.11 This was to "[test] the fitness of applicants for 
the public service" and required the exams be "pl'actical in their 
character" and "fafr[ly] test the relative capacity and fitness" of 
the applicant. 12 The act also created Lhe Civil Service Commission 
(CSC), a precw'sor to the Merit Systems Protection Board. 13 The 
CSC was charged with evaluating and hiring employees tlu·ough 
the competitive exams.14 However, due process was not included 
in the Civil Service until an Executive Order by William McKinley 
in 1897, mandating that no removals may be made from the Civil 
Service without just cause, a notice period, and an opportunity for 
the employee to respond. Lo 
However, no legislation was passed into law to ensure that 
the McKinley Executive Order was followed until 1912, when the 
Lloyd-LaFollete Act16 was passed, codifying the just cause 
7. See Department of Veterans Affai1·s Accountabi lity and Whistleblower Protection 
i\ct of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-4], 131 Stat. 862 (2017). 
8. Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act of 1883, ch. 27, § 1, 22 Stat. 403. 
9. U.S. MERJT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, WHAT IS DUE PROCESS IN FEDERAL CIVIL 
SERVJCi,; EMPLOYMENT? 3-5 (2015) [hereinafter What is Due Process?] (the "spoils 
system" stems from the phrase "Lho spoils of wnr", the "wai:" being federal elections, 
and the "spoils" being the federal government posilions tha~ were awarded Lo political 
part,r supporters as a reward for political contributions). 
10. Id. at 3-4. 
11. Id. 
12. Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act of 1883, ch. 27 § 2, 22 Stat. 403. 
13. Id. at§ l. 
14. id. at §2. 
15. Exec. Order No. 101 (July 27, L897), https://0-heinonline-
org.libus.csd.mu.eclu/JIOUPage?collection=presidents&handle=hein.presidents/prsex 
cuo000 1&id=284&men_ta b:srchresu\Ls. 
16. Lloy<l-LaFollette Act. of 1912, ch. 389, 37 Stat. 555. 
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standard and the required notice and opportunity to respond. 17 
Congress passed this act in an attempt to curtail adverse actions 
taken in reprisal for whistleblowing, and the statute granted the 
Civil Service Commission a right to review records pertaining to 
the adverse action.18 However, no right to a hearing or 
examination of witnesses was required under the Lloyd-LaFollete 
Act unless the official performing the removal provided them. 19 
Due to the limited scope, the focus at this time was on the 
procedure of the removal, not the cause of the removal.20 
In 1944, the Veterans' Preference Act21 arrived, granting 
returning World War Two veterans a preference in being hired 
into the Civil Service, and also giving those veterans a right to file 
an appeal with the Civil Service Commission for any major 
adverse actions.22 However, the Veterans' Preference Act did not 
require any federal agencies to follow the Civil Service 
Commissions' decisions, so the Veterans' Preference Act was 
amended in 1948 to require agencies to follow the CSC 
recornmendations.23 While the Veterans' Preference Act covered 
veterans, it was up to the individual agencies to decide what 
protections to grant non-veterans, if any.24 However, agencies 
that had greater national security duties, like the Department of 
the Army, Mutual Security Agency, and the Veterans' 
Administration did extend the hearing and appeal rights to non-
veterans for adverse actions rising from misconduct, poor 
performance, and malfeasance. 25 
The watershed moment in federal civil service was in 1978, 
when Congress passed the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA).26 
This disposed of the patchwork protections given to civil service 
employees from the previous legislation and executive orders 
mentioned, and transitioned all federal civil service employees to 
a consistent standard across all executive agencies.27 This 
legislation also split the Civil Service Commission into the Merit 
17. Id. at §6. 
18. What is Due Process?, supra note 9, at 6. 
19. Id. 
20. Jd. at 7. 
21. Veterans' Preference Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-359, 58 Stat. 387. 
22. What is Due Process?, supra note 9 , at 7. 
23. Id. at 7-8. 
24. /d. at 8. 
25. SENATE COMMI'r'l'EE: ON POS1' OFFlCE AND CML SERVl CE, APPEALS AND GRIEVANCE: 
PROCEDURES IN 'l'HE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, 8 (J 953). 
26. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111. 
27. What is Due Proces.~?. supra note 9, at 9-10. 
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Systems Protection Board (MSPB), the Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM), and the Federal Labor Relations Authority 
(FLRA).28 The CSRA gave the MSPB reviewing power over all 
adverse actions taken under the CSRA.29 This legislation also 
enumerated the right for all civil service employees to have notice 
of the charges in an adverse action, a reasonable opportunity to 
respond, and the abflity to appeal decisions in front of a neutral 
body.30 This was the last major civil service law applicable to 
general service employees government wide; there have been 
subsequent laws pertaining to different types of employees and 
department specific changes, but many have been short lived.3t 
B. The History of the Veterans Administration and the 
History of the Department of Veterans Affa irs 
The Veterans Administration, the direct predecessor to the 
Department of Veterans Affairs, was created in 1930 by President 
Herbert Hoover, through Executive Order 5398.32 This order 
combined various World Wa1· I-era veterans programs, like the 
United States Veterans Bureau, the Bureau of Pensions, and the 
National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers into one 
independent government agency.33 The Veterans Administration 
would exist as an independent government agency until 1988, 
when the agency was renamed the "Department of Veterans 
Affairs" and elevated to a cabinet level position.34 
Recently, a few agency specific laws have been introduced 
that would have changed the Department of Veterans Affairs 
procedures on employee removals and adverse actions,35 and one 
agency specific law that passed changed the VA handling of the 
Senior Executive Service, stripping many of the employee 
protections that Senior Executives were entitled to receive.36 The 
2014 Accountability Act, which was passed quickly with little 
28. See generally Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111. 
29. Id. (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §1205 (1982)). 
30. Id. (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §7503 (1982)). 
31. What is Due Process?, supra note 9, at 33, 36. 
32. Exec. Order No. 5398, 38 C.F.R. §1.1 (1938). 
33. Id. 
34. Department of Veterans Affairs Act of 1988, Pub. IJ. No. 100-627 §2. 
35. E.g. H.R. 2189, 113th Cong. (2013); Demanding Accountability for Veterans Act of 
2013, H.R. 2072, 113th Cong. (2013); Dep't. of Veterans Aff. Mgmt. Accountability Act 
of 2014, H.R. 4031, 113th Cong. (2014). 
36. Veterans' Access to Care through Choice, Accountability, and Transparency Act of 
2014, P.L. 113-146, 128 Stat. 1798 (codi• ecl at 38 U.S.C. §713 (2014)). 
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debate, significantly shortened the notice and response period 
mandated by the Fifth Amendment, and 1·emoves the opportunity 
for Senior Executives to appeal the Agency decision to the MSPB37 
C. Judicial Interpretation and Incorporation of Due 
Process 
The judicial history of due process in public employment 
starts at the state level, with Cleveland Board of Education u. 
Loudermill. 38 The Court held that public sector employees, if a 
statute is in place that grants them just cause protection, have a 
property intei-est in their jobs, and due process is required under 
the Fifth Amendment to take away that property interest.39 
James Loudermill was an employee of the Cleveland Board 
of Education, and a civil servant.40 Prior to his hiring, Loudermill 
claimed that he had never had been convicted of a felony, which 
was untrue.41 Upon the Board of Education discovering this 
dishonesty, he was removed from his job without an opportunity 
to respond to the charge or to challenge the decision. 42 Ohio had 
a statute at the time that civil service employees were covered 
under just cause protection.43 The Supreme Court held that the 
state could give the property right, in this case a job, but cannot 
freely take the property away or limit due process procedures that 
concern taken property.44 The Court also held that if due process 
applies, the question becomes what process is due, and clarified 
that even if the facts of the adverse action were clear, due process 
was still required.45 Removal without due process prior to 
termination is unconstitutional, and an employee must be given 
notice and opportunity to respond.46 However, pre-termination 
procedures, while still required, can be abridged if a sufficient 
37. See Ashton HubighusL. B11/rancillg Accow1tability at the Department of Vctcratts 
Affairs: The Legality of //111 Veterans Access, Choice, cmcl Acco11ntability Act of 201'1 
Under the Due Process Clause, 64 CATH. U. L. Rr-:v. 101 5, 105'1-55 (2015} (dii;cussinc 
t.hc unconstiLuLionaliLy of lhe 2014 staL\1lc). 
38. See generally Cleveland Bd. Of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985). 
39. ld. at 538-39. 




44. Id. at 541. 
45. ld. at 538, 541. 
46. Id. at 546. 
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post-termination procedure exists.47 
The Loudermill doctrine regarding an employee's property 
rights and the due process required to take that property has 
since been recognized by the Supreme Court as applicable to the 
federal civil service. ~s In Lachance v. Erickson49 six federal civil 
service employees were removed after making false statements 
during investigations into misconduct that were independent 
grounds for an adverse action.Go In the majority opinion, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist explicitly includes the Loudermill doctrine into 
the evaluation of whether these employees received adequate due 
process.61 The Federal Circuit has since stated that the federal 
statutory employment scheme creates a property interest i11 
continued employment because it is specified that civil service 
employees may only be dismissed fol' cause or unacceptable 
performance.02 It does not matter that the Civil Service Reform 
Act does not explicitly state the need for due process,;;3 the 
implication of the assurances for continued employment extend 
the Fifth Amendment to public sector employees. 
Judicial doctrine, along with legislative history in the area of 
due prncess and property rights pertaining to civil service jobs, 
shows a clear indication of when due process applies. If the 
government has designated a job as having a just cause 
p1·otection, Lhis makes the job a property right.54 Once the job is 
a property right, the government then has to provide procedures 
fo1· adverse actions, including a notice procedure and an 
opportunity to respond.55 In addition, the government can strike 
a balance between governmental needs and the rjsk of an 
erroneous property deprival to determine how much process is 
due, but they cannot wholly deprive an individual of a1l due 
process.56 
The history of federal employees receiving due process 
pl'Otections for their job is long, and short of repealing the Civil 
Service Reform Act and the language that states a federal job 
47. ld. at 5117-48. 
48. What is Due Process?, supra not.e 9, al 18 
49. Lachance v. Erickson, 522 US 262 (1998). 
50. Id. at 264. 
51. Id. at 266. 
52. Stone v. FDIC, 179 F.3d 1368, 1374-1375 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
53. See generally Civil Service Reform Act of l 978, supra not,e 26. 
54. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 928-29 (1997). 
55. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 5'16 (1985). 
56. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976), discussed infra. 
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shall have just cause protection, subsequent legislation must 
provide due process before adverse actions are taken. The 
Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and 
Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017 (Accountability Act)57 
unconstitutionally curtails employee due process rights. To show 
this, the Accountability Act will be compared to the Civil Service 
Reform Act to determine what procedures have changed, and then 
the Accountability Act will be evaluated using the Matthews u. 
Eldridge balancing test58 to determine if the due process provided 
by the Accountability Act is sufficient. If the Accountability Act 
fails this balancing test, repeal seems to be th e only way to remove 
the act, since the Federal Circuit Court overwhelmingly upholds 
the MSPB decision in federal employment cases and the MSPB 
decision is hamstrung by the Accountability Act requiring a low 
standard of proof in MSPB proceedings. Finally, this 
Accountability Act may in fact do nothing to improve the 
Department of Veterans Affairs and instead acts as a symbolic 
piece of legislation for anti-organized labor politicians, and an 
effort to privatize government services further. 
Ill. C CVIl, SERVICE REFORM ACT VS. THE NEW ACCOUNTABILITY 
ACT 
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 forms the basis of most 
civil service jobs across the executive branch, and formed the basis 
of Title 5 of the U.S. Code.69 Title 5 has two chapters that deal 
with adverse actions for all federal employees in the executive 
branch, Chapter 43 Performance Appraisal and Chapter 75 
Adverse Actions.60 The Accountability Act provides an alternative 
to be used solely by V A.61 There are significant differences 
between the Title 5 adverse action procedures and the adverse 
action procedures from the Accountability Act. 
57. Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act 
of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-41, 131 Stat. 862. 
58. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335. 
59. See generally Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, P .L. 95-454, 92 Stat . 1111. 
60. 5 U.S.C. §7503 (2012); 5 U.S.C. § 7513 (2012); 5 U.S.C. § 4303 (2017) (as amended 
by P.L. 115-41). 
61. Department of Ve Le rans Affairs Accountability and Wbfatleblower Protection Act 
of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-41, 131 Stat. 862 (codified at 38 U.S.C. §714). 
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A. Title 5, Chapter 75: Adverse Actions 
Chapter 75 Adverse Actions are split into two different levels 
of severity, with different procedures for each level. The first 
applies solely to suspensions of 14 days or less.62 This type of 
adverse action requires advanced written notice, a "reasonable 
time to answer" orally and in writing, the right be represented by 
an attorney or another representative, and a written decision with 
the specific reasons for suspension, provided at the "earliest 
practicable date".63 'L'his minor reprimand is not appealab1e to the 
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) unless another statute 
applies as well, such as in cases of whistleblowing or 
discri.mj na bon. 64 
More serious adverse actions, such as removals, suspensions 
of more than 14 days, demotions in pay or gi-ade, or furloughs for 
more than 30 days, receive more extensive procedure and 
protections under Chapter 75.ll5 When taking adverse action 
against employees, the vast majority of federal executive branches 
prefet· taking action under t his section of the US Code.66 A 
Chapter 75 adverse action is determined by managerial 
disc1·etion, and can be taken for both conduct issues and 
performance issues.G7 The decision must be reasouable and for 
"such cause as wil l promote the efficiency of the service," and the 
punishment must not be excessive to the charged behavior.GS This 
test includes twelve " DoLLglas factors" to assess the 
reasonableness of the agency's decision, but none of these twelve 
factors are controlling, and they require the agency to perform a 
balancing test to dete1·mine the proper discipline. 69 Even if the 
62. 5 u.s.c. §7503 (2012). 
63. What is Due Process?, supra note 9, at 27. 
64. ld. 
65. 5 u.s.c. § 7513 (2012). 
66. U .S. MERIT SYSTEM PROTEC'f1ON BOARD, AODRESSlNG POOR PERFORMBRS AND THE 
l.AW (ScpL. 2009), 
htlps://www.msph.gov/mspbsearch/viewdocs.nspx?tlocnu m ber=44584 l &version=4 469 
88&upJ)licaLion=J\CROBJ\'l'. [l1ercinafLer Poor Porformon•J. 
67. Id. at 3. 
68. Douglas v. Veterans Ad min., 5 M.S.P,B. 313, 337 (1981). 
69. Id. at 332. 1'he f,welvo fact.ors for evaluation are: 
(1) The nature nnd seriousness or the oITcnsl!, nnd its relation to the employee's duties, 
11osition. ond respon$ibiliLies. including whelhcl" the offense was intonLional or 
tcchnicnl 01· inadvert.enL, 01· was committed molicio11sly or for gain, or wns frequently 
repeat.eel: 
(2) The employee's job level and typu of employment, inclnding supervisory or fiduciary 
role, conLacts with the public, and promjnenco of the position; 
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Agency properly applies the Douglas factors, if (1) there was a 
harmful error in the application of the procedures, (2) the adverse 
action is discriminatory or in retaliation to whistleblowing, or (3) 
the decision was against the law in any other way, the decision 
shall not be uphcld.70 
Along with the reasonableness evaluation, Chapter 75 
removals have statutorily defined due process procedures.71 As 
stated in Loudermill, procedural due process fox government 
employees with just cause protections include notice and an 
opportunity to respond.Tl Chapter 75 has statutorily defined 
entitlements for employees who have an adverse action taken 
against them. When an agency proposes an adver se action, an 
employee is entitled to thirty days advanced written notice stating 
the reason for action, unless there is cause to believe the employee 
has committed a crime.73 The employee is then allowed to answer 
the notice in a reasonable amount of time, with a minimum of 
seven days response ti me, and may be represented by an attorney 
or another representative.74 
Finally, the employee will receive a written decision at the 
"earliest practicable date", and may appeal this decision to the 
MSPB.75 Once appealed to the MSPB, the agency's decision must 
(3) The employee's past disciplinary record; 
(4) Tho employee's past work l"ecord, including length of service, performance on the 
job, ability to get along with fellow workers, and dependability; 
{5) 11he oITecL of the offense upon the employee's ability Lo perform at a satisfactory 
level nnd its effect upon supervisors' confidence in Lhe employee's ability to perfo1·m 
assigned duLies; 
(6) Consistency of the penally with those imposed upon other employees for the same 
or similor oITcnses; 
(7) Consistency of the penalty with any applicable agency table of penalties; 
(8) The notoriety of the offense or its irnpnct. upon the reputation of the agency: 
(9) 'rho clarity wit.h which lhe employee wn:1 on not.ice of any rules thal where violated 
in commiLLing the offense. 01· had been warned about the conclucl in quest.ion; 
(10) Potential for the employee's rehabilitation; 
(11) Mitigating circumstances surrounding tho offense such as unusual job tensions, 
personality problems. mental impairmenL, harassment, or bad foith, mulice or 
p1·ovocation on Lho part of others involved in the matLc1·; and 
(12) The adequacy and effectiveness of alternative sanctions to deter such conduct in 
the future by the employee or others. 
70. 5 U.S.C. § 7701 (c)(2) (2012). 
71. 5 u.s.c. § 7513(b) (2012). 
72. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 642. 
73. 5 u.s.c. § 7513(b)(1) (2012). 
74. 5 u.s.c. §§ 7513(b)(2)-(3) (2012). 
75. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b),(d) (2012). 
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be supported by a preponderance of the evidence76, or in other 
words, "the agency has the bu1·den to prove it is more likely than 
not that the conclusion reached was correct."77 If the action taken 
by the agency does not meet the Douglas factors, the MSPB can 
mitigate and modify the agency's penalty.78 'fhis system was 
carefully crafted to fit closely with the Constitution and to make 
smc that adve1·se actions "stick" while preserving employee's 
Constitutional rights.79 
B. Title 5, Chapter 43: Performance Appraisal 
Adverse actions taken under Title 5, Chapter 43 are 
exclusively actions taken due to poor performance of an employee 
in a critical element of the job. The procedures under Chapter 43 
are similar, but have two notable differences. First, Chapter 43 
actions have a lower standard of proof, only requiring substantial 
evidence upon appeal, and second, a performance improvement 
plan (PIP) must be proposed and implemented prior lo the 
adverse action.so As the Merit Systems Protection Board reports, 
"[t]he use of a PIP is the primary trade-off supervisors must 
accept if they want to use the lowe1· buxden of proof that Chapter 
43 offers."81 
A performance improvement plan typically includes clea1· 
performance standards, how those standards will be measured, 
any assistance the agency will offer the employee to improve, and 
specifies bow long the PIP wi.11 rem.ain in place.82 PIPs are 
supposed to be flexible based upon job description and agency 
need, so there isn't a strict list of things that a PIP must include, 
just a recommended list from which the agency can pick and 
choose.83 
The Douglas factors are not requi red for a Chapter 43 action, 
and the MSPB cannot mitigate the penalty the agency chooses to 
use in the adverse action.84 The key appellate proof in Chapter 
43 actions, which is not required in Chapter 75 actions, is the 
76. 5 U.S.C. § 770l(c)(l)(B) (2012). 
77. Poor P erformers, suprn note 66, aL 7. 
78. Id. at 10. 
79. What is Du,e Process?, supra noLe 9, at 30. 
80. Poor Performers, supra note 66, aL 7. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 8. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 9-10. 
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"critical element." A critical element "means a work assignment 
or responsibility of such importance that unacceptable 
performance on the element would result in a determination that 
an employee's overall performance is unacceptable."85 The critical 
element must be specified in the PIP, and must inform the 
employee of the expected acceptable performance. 86 If the critical 
element is not clear, it can only be clarified, and not rewritten.87 
Critical elements that are beyond salvage, to the point the 
element needs to be rewritten, cannot be used for a Chapter 43 
action.88 
Chapter 75 can be used for performance-based adverse 
actions as well, but all Chapter 75 procedures must be followed.89 
Due to the higher initial burden on management to be proactive 
in Chapter 43 actions, and the pressure for the PIP to be written 
correctly, Chapter 43 was used approximately 42% of the time in 
FY 2007, while Chapter 75 was used in approximately 58% of 
adverse actions taken in that same year.90 The Department of 
Veterans Affairs between FY 1998 and FY 2007 resembles a 
similar split, with the VA preferring Chapter 75 actions 62% of 
the time, and only using Chapter 43 actions 38% of the time.91 
C. Title 38, Chapter 7: Veterans Affairs Employees 
On June 23rd, 2017, the Accountability Act was passed into 
law, a nd created a thfrd way to take adverse act ions against 
employees working for the Department of Veterans Affairs. The 
Accountability Act includes all employees who work for the 
Department, except for senior executives92, political appointees93, 
p1·obationary employees94 , a nd speciaJized employees such as 
physicians, medical center directors, and others.95 The employees 
85. 5 C.F'.R. §430.203 (2018). 
86. Poor Performers, supra note 66, at 10. 
87. Id. 
88. ld. 
89. Id. at iii . 
90. Id. at 13-14. 
91. i d. at 15. 
92. 38 U.S.C. § 714(h)(l)(A) (2012). 
93. 38 U.S.C. § 714(h)(l)(D) (2012). 
94 . 38 U.S.C § 714(h)(l )(C) (2012). 
95. 38 U.S.C. § 714(h)(l)(O) (2012) (l'cfcrring to 38 U.S.C. §§7306, 1,101(1), 7401(4), 
7406 ("an individual appointed pursuanL to sections 7306, 7401(1), 7'101(4), or 7405 of 
I.h is Litle" 
Section 7306 is the controlling section for the OCfice of the Under Secretary of Health 
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not excluded have received a sharp decrease in due process from 
this Accountability Act, in direct contrast to the carefully 
constructed process from the CSRA. 
Adverse actions taken under the Accountability Act are 
taken at the Secretary of Veterans Affair's discretion, and can be 
taken for either misconduct or poor performance. 96 The Secretary 
can remove, suspend, or demote any individual covered by the act 
with little due process.97 After the Secretary makes this decision, 
the aggregate time for notice, response, and final decision is set at 
a maximum of 15 business days.98 During those 15 days, a seven 
day block of time is allotted to the individual for a response.99 
After 15 business days have passed, it is statutorily required for 
the Secretary to issue a final decision in writing.100 
'l'he law provides for a modified and expedited appellate 
review of the decision at the MSPB by an administrabve judge JOL 
The appeal must be ulcd within 10 business days a~er the final 
decision has been made.102 After receiving the appeal, the 
administrative judge has 180 days to complete the case and issue 
a final decision. 10:i The standard of review is notably lower for 
these §714 removals than for removals taken under the CSRA. 
For these §714 removals, the standard of evidence used is 
"substantial evidence", and agency decisions that are supported 
by substantial evidence must be deferred to by the administrative 
judge, and cannot be nutigated.104 Substantial evidence is defined 
Section 7401(1) applies to "Physicians, denlisLs, podinb·ists, chi1'0lll'llct.ors, 
optometrists, registered nurses, physiciun assistants, and expanded-function dentnl 
auxiliaries." 
Sec Lion 7401 ('1) applies to "Dil'ectors or medical centers and directors of Veterans 
lnteg,·oted Service Net.works wiLh demonstl'n.Lcd ability in tho medical profession, in 
health cnro administration, or in health Clll'0 fiscal management.'' 
Section 7'105 RJ>plios Lcmpo1·ary full-time nppointments, pol't-time appoi11t.mcnt!;I, and 
withouL-compcnsaLion appointmcntS in posiLions listed under 7401(1), 7'101(3) 
(vnrious healthcare pl'Ofessionnls not specified under 7'101 (I) who provide direct health 
care to vctcra11s), lihrnrians, ond "Other professional, clc1·icnl, Lcchnical, and unskilled 
personnel (including intol'ns. resid<mt.<;, trainees, uncl students in medical supporL 
programs).'') 
96. 38 U.S.C. § 714(a)(l) (2012). 
97. 38 U .S.C. § 714(a)(2)(A)-(C) (2012). 
98. 38 U.S.C. § 714(c)(1)(A) (2012). 
99. 38 U.S.C. § 714(c)(l)(B) (2012). 
100. 38 U.S.C. § 71'1(c)(2) (2012). 
101. 38 U.S.C. § 714(d)(l) (2012). 
102. 38 U.S.C. § 71'1(c)(4)(8) (2012). 
J03. 38 U.S.C. § 714(d)(1) (2012). 
104. 38 U.S.C. § 714(d)(2)(B) (2012). 
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as "[t]he degree of r elevant evidence that a reasonable person, 
considering the record as a whole, might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion, even though other reasonable persons might 
disagree."105 This is the same standard of evidence used in 
Chapter 43 Performance Appraisals, and a lower standard of 
review than used in Chapter 75 Adverse Actions. 106 The employee 
may then appeal to the United States F ederal Circuit Court of 
Appeals, where the court will review the record and set aside any 
agency action that is (1) found to be arbitrary or capricious, (2) not 
following the required laws, rules, or regulation, or (3) a decision 
unsupported by substantial evidence. to7 This Federal Circuit 
standard had only been used for §7401(1) employees, who were 
largely white-collar professionals, 108 until the new Accountability 
Act, which extends this standard to every covered employee. 109 
This change in standards at both appellate levels essentially 
hamstrings the court system into following the Agency decision, 
unless the Agency decision is so egregious that no reasonable 
person could find that the Agency made the correct decision. 
The VA cannot have its cake and eat it too. The 
Accountability Act combines parts of both Chapter 43 (lower 
standard of proof) and Chapter 75 (does not have to give the 
employee an opportunity to improve) most preferable to the 
Agency, slaps on an onerous time period for the average worker, 
and hamstrings the courts, creating a law that is misguided, 
unjust, and unconstitutional. 
IV. THE ACCOUNTABILITY ACT LACKS SUFFICIENT DUE 
PROCESS UNDER 'rHE MATHEWS V. ELDRIDGE BALANCING TEST 
The Accountability Act unconstitutionally strips employees 
of their requisite due process by imposing short time periods in 
the pre-termination process and hamstringing the appellate 
courts in the post-termination process. As discussed supra, 
federal employees have a property interest in their job due to the 
Civil Service Reformation Act, and are constit utionally required 
to have Fifth Amendment due process prior to the taking of that 
105. 5 C.l<'.R. § 1201.4(p) (2018), 
106. Poor Performers, supra note 66, at iv. 
107. See generally 5 U.S.C. §706 (2012). 
108. 38 U.S.C. § 7401 (1) (2012) a pplies to "Physicians, dentists, podiatrists, 
ch iropractors, optometrists, registered nurses, physician assistants, and expanded-
function dental auxiliaries." 
109. 38 U.S.C. §714 (h)(l)(a)-(d) (2012). 
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property.110 'l'he courts must perform a balancing test to consider 
whether sufficient due process has been given to an employee who 
has had an adverse action taken against them.111 
The balancing test comes from Mathews u. Eldridge,112 and 
has been adopted for use in evaluating the extent of due process 
needed for adverse actions taken against government 
employees.113 The three components of this test are: "First, the 
private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's 
interest."114 Applying this Matthews test will show that the due 
process given to employees through the Accountability Act is 
insufficient. 
A. Prongs 1 and 3: Private and Government Interests 
The first and third prongs of the test are not in dispute. It is 
well-established case law that an employee has a private interest 
in continuing to receive a paycheck, and it is equally well 
established that the federal government needs to be able to 
discipline underperforming employees, criminal employees, and 
other employees guilty of malfeasances.115 
B. Prong 2: Balancing the Risk of Erroneous 
Deprivation 
The second prong is where the Accountability Act will fail; 
the risk of erroneous deprivation is too high, and the procedural 
safeguards have been trimmed back to the point that they bold 
little probative value. Suspensions are allowed to have a lower 
due process standard than removals, but both require this 
balancing test to be completed. 116 The length and the finality of 
the deprivation are dispositive factors in the second prong. m 
1 lO. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 4 70 U.S. 532 (1985). 
ll l. Id. at 542-43. 
112. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 384-35 (L976). 
113. Gilbel't v . Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 931-32 (1997). 
114. /d. at 931-932 (quoting Mathews, 42'1 U.S. at 335). 
115. E.g., Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 928-29; Cleveland Boat"dof Education v. Loudermill, 470 
U.S. 552 (1985); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Company, 455 US 422, 435 (1982). 
116. Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 934-35. 
117. Id. at 932. 
2018] VAACCOUNTABJLITY 115 
The risk of erroneous deprivation is too mgh for employees. 
The short time period given does not allow an employee to seek 
adequate legal representation to navigate the notice and response 
period, along with any appeals. The level of due process given 
must be related to the finality and seriousness of the deprivation, 
and nothing is more final or serious than a permanent removal. 
When a state must act quickly, like when employees have 
committed serious crimes at work, the opportunity to respond 
may occur after the employee has been deprived of the job.118 The 
Sixth Circuit found that pre-termination proceedings and post-
termination proceedings are fundamentally intertwined, so a 
deficit in one can be made up in the other. 119 In Carter u. Western 
Reserve Psychiatric Habilitation Center, an employee was 
terminated and the pre-termination proceedings were 
abbreviated.120 Due to abbreviated pre-termination proceedings, 
the Court stated that post-termination hearings must be 
"substantially more meaningful" in the interest of due process.12 1 
The Accountability Act provides neither adequate time for 
notice and response in the pre-termination phase, nor does the 
Act provide an adequate post-termination hearing. The shortened 
time period before the adverse action takes place may be 
permissible if the standard of evidence had not been lowered to a 
nearly impossible-to-beat standard. The substantial evidence 
standard used by the MSPB and the Federal Circuit is so low of a 
standard that it stands to reason that there is no meaningful due 
process. 
This substantial evidence standard was previously used after 
performance improvement plans and meetings with the employee 
happened, pursuant to Chapter 43 actions. This paper trail, and 
the opportunity to improve was a significant pre-termination 
proceeding and struck a balance between the needs of the 
employee and the needs of the employer. Chapter 75 adverse 
actions had less paperwork, but a higher evidentiary standard, 
providing the employee more meaningful post-termination due 
process. The Accountability Act leads to employees having 
adverse actions taken against them and lost appeals in both the 
118. Id. at 930. 
119. Carte r v. W. Reserve Psychiatric Habilitation Ctr., 767 F.2d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 
1985). 
120. Id. at 272. 
121. Id. at 273, 274 (interna l quotations omitted)(The substance of the post-
termination hear ings was unclear, as it was not included in the record sent to the Six th 
Circuit Court of Appeals). 
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MSPB and the Federal Circuit because a reasonable person may 
determine that the record adequately supports the same 
conclusion as the VA, even if that reasonable person believes the 
opposing view is more compelling. Not only is the risk of 
erroneous deprivation too high for the employee, the risk is too 
high for the government as well. 
The second stated purpose of the Accountability Act is 
"whistleblower protection". The VA has been ravaged by 
retaliation against whistleblowing under the old due process 
scheme. L22 VA clinics have been accused of using "sham peer 
reviews to permanently sabotage doctors' credibility. Physicians 
truly face losing their livelihood".123 The whistleblowing has been 
widely covered in the news and was part of the justification in 
passing the Accountability Act. 124 
Whistleblower retaliation is growing worse under the Trump 
adntinistration, with one VA physician referring to the time 
period after the Accountability Act had been passed as "open 
season across the nation on VA w histleblowers". 125 Whistleb lower 
offices that are being held "in-house" are often referred to as 
"Trojan horses used to identify whistleblowers for retaliation" .126 
It is counterintujtive for the Trump administration and the 115th 
Congress to pass a law that simultaneously allows the federal 
government to make it easier to fire workers, while allegedly 
guaranteeing these same workers whistleblower protections from 
retaliatory firings. 
The Accountability Act fails the second prong of the Mathews 
v. Eldridge test: "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if 
any, of additional [or substitute] procedural safeguards".t27 VA 
employees are being erroneously deprived of their jobs due to the 
122. Josh Hicks, VA Employees Testify About Retaliation Against Whistleblowers, THE 
WASinNGTON POST (Jul. 9, 2014), https://www.washingtonposL.com/news/federal-
eye/wp/2014/07 /09/va -cm ployees-testi fy-a bout-reta I ia tion -against-whist I ebl owe rs/. 
123. Id. (lntcrnal quotation marks omitted). 
124. Sen. Marco Rubio et. al. Commentary: VA Bureaucracy Continues to Protect Bad 
Employees, Hurt U. 8. Troops, MILITARY TIMES (May 11, 2017) 
https://www.militarytimes.com/veterans/2017 /05/11 /com men ta ry-va-bureaucracy • 
continues-to-protcct-bad-employecs-hurt-u-s-tt·oops/. 
125. Joe Davidson, Victims Say VA Whistleblower Retaliation is Growing Under 
'lhimp, Despite Rhetoric, THE WASlIINGTON POST (Oct. 30, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/ncws/powerpostlwp/2017/10/30/victims-say-va-
w hislleblower-retalia Lion-is-growing-under-Lrum p-despite-rhetoric/. 
126. Id. 
127. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 321. 
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lower standards of the Accountability Act, often in retaliation for 
whistleblowing, a protected activity. The procedural safeguards 
have little value due to the speed and ease that the VA has with 
firing employees. 
V. REPEALING OR OVERRULING THE ACT 
This Accountability Act is unconstitutional and should be 
repealed by the legislature or declared unconstitutional by the 
judiciary. After coming to the conclusion that the Accountability 
Act is unconstitutional, the question remains: how does one go 
about striking the Act from U.S. Code? The answer may come 
down to a future Congress. Other statutes that modify the Civil 
Service Reform Act on an agency-specific basis are notably short, 
and many have been repealed by a later Congress.128 For 
example, the 1996 Department of Transportation and Related 
Agencies Appropriations Act129 removed the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) from the jurisdiction of the MSPB 
completely, and then the Wendell H. Ford Investment and Reform 
Act for the 21st Century130 mostly put the FAA back under MSPB 
jurisdiction.131 It may be necessary that a more employee-rights 
focused Congress will do a similar thing with the Accountability 
Act, and restore employee rights in the VA. 
The Accountability Act was passed on a bipartisan basis, and 
thus a change in leadership in Congress and the Presidency may 
not be enough to repeal the act. The final vote counts of the act 
in the House of Representatives were 368 in favor, and 55 
opposed, with seven representatives not voting.132 On a partisan 
basis, 231 Republicans and 137 Democrats voted in favor of this 
Act, and 1 Republican and 54 Democrats voted against the Act.133 
The Senate passed the Act on a voice vote, so no record of 
individual votes were made by Senators. 184 A small window into 
128. What is Due Process?, s i,pra note 9, at 36. 
129. Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-50, 109 St.at. 436 (1995). 
130. Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century, Pub. 
L. No. 106-181, 114 Stat. 61 (2000). 
131. id. 
132. S. l094: Departmerit of Veterans Affairs Accountability and Whistleblower 
Protectiori Act of 2017, GOVTRACK, htt,ps://www.govtTack.us/congress/votes/ll5-
2017/h307 (last visited Jan. 19, 2018). 
133. Id. 
134. S. 1094: Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and Whistleblower 
Protecti.on Act of 2017, GOVTRACK (last, updated June 14, 2017), 
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the Senate proceedings on the bill would be looking at the co-
sponsors of the bill, which were made up of 31 Republicans, 7 
Democrats, and 1 Independent,135 who joined the lead sponsor, 
Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL) in passing this bill. 136 President Donald 
Trump eagerly supported the bill, tweeting to the internet that: 
The passage of the @DeptVetAffairs Accountability and 
Whistleblower Protection Act is GREAT news for veterans! I look 
forward to signing itP37 
Other laws with similar means and ends also passed with 
bipartisan support. The Veterans Access to Care through Choice, 
Accountability, and Transparency Act of 2014, which limited due 
process for senior executives in the VA passed 91-3 in the Senate 
and 420-5 in the House of Representatives.138 President Obama 
signed the 2014 bill into law with little delay.139 Both laws limit 
federal employee rights, and both laws were passed on a 
bipartisan basis. The Accountability Act is already being treated 
as a foundation and model for future accountability acts that will 
affect other executive departments. 140 Both the Labor 
https://www.govtrack.us/congrcss/bills/115/s 1094. 
135. S . 1091: Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and Whistleblower 
Protection Act of 2017, Details, GOVTRACK, 
https:/lwww.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/s1094/details (last visited Dec. 21, 2018). 
136. S. 1094: Department of Veterans Affairs Accotmtability and Whi.stleblower 
Protection Act of 2017, Summary, GOV'fRACK, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/sl094/summary (last visited Dec. 21, 
2018). 
137. Donald Trump, (@rea!Donald'l'rump), 'l'WT'M'ER (Jun. 13, 2017, 1:18 PM), 
https://twitter.comlrcaJDonaldTrump/status/874767922295705600; Pres. Trump also 
tweeted support for the bill after it was initially passed by the Senate and sent to the 
House of Representatives, stating, "Senate passed the VA Accountability Act. The 
House should get this bill to my desk ASAP! We can't tolerate substandard care for 
our vets." Donald 1'rump, (@realDonaldTrump), 'Pwl'f'fER (Jun. 6, 2017, 6:07 PM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonald'l'i-ump/status/872258719404482561. 
138. All those who voted against the 2014 Act in both the Senate and the !Jouse of 
Representatives were Republicans; GOVTRACK, H.R. 3230 (113th): Veterans Access, 
Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014, Senate Vote #254 in 2014 (J 13th Congress), 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/J 13-2014/s251 (last visited Sept,. 30, 2018); 
GOVTRACI<, H.R. 3230 (113th): Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014, 
House Vote #467 in 2014 (113th Congress) 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/l l3-20l1/h467 (last visited Sept. 30, 2018); 
See Ashton Habighurst, Enhancing Accountability at the Department of Veterans 
Affairs: The Legality of the Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014 
Under the Due Process Clause, 61(4) Cath. U. L. Rev. 1045, 1054-55 (2015). 
139. Cameron Brenchley, President Obama Signs Bill to Give the VA the Resources lt 
Needs, THE WIIITE HOUSE: PHl,SlDEN1' BARACK OBAMA, BLOG (Aug. 7, 2014), 
https://obamawhitehonse.archives.gov/blog/2014/08/07/president-obama-signs-bill-
give-va-resources-it-needs. 
140. Nicole Ogrysko, lfotise Bills Would Extend Same VA Removal Authorities to 
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Department Accountability Act141 and the Education Department 
Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act142 were 
introduced into the House of Representatives in December 2017, 
though neither has gained much traction. 143 In the interim, 
President Trump has since signed an Executive Order instructing 
all executive agencies to push for more removals under Title 5, 
and forbidding contract bargaining negotiations over removal 
procedures. 144 
However, in 2018 there has been a bipartisan pushback in 
the House of Representatives and the Senate regarding the way 
the Accountability Act is being executed by the VA. Members of 
the Committee on Veterans' Affairs in the Senate wrote letters to 
then Secretary Shulkin and to the VA Inspector General, Michael 
J. Missal.145 A February 13, 2018 letter from Senator Tammy 
Duckworth (D-IL) to Shulkin contained criticisms about the bill 
being used primarily to remove front-line workers like 
housekeeping aids, cooks, and laundry workers instead of higher-
ranking VA personnel such as supervisors who are experiencing 
performance problems or committing misconduct. 146 A February 
26, 2018 letter from Jon 1'ester (D-MT), Richard Blumenthal (D-
CT), et. al, states that the VA has ceased using progressive 
discipline, and managers in the VA are removing employees for 
first offenses such as moving too slowly after returning from 
l.,abor, Education Secretaries, FEDERAL Ni,ws RADIO (Feb. 28, 2018), 
https://federalnewsradio.com/legislation/2018/02/house-bills-wou]d-extend-same-va-
removal-authoriLies-to-labor-education-employees/. 
141. Department of Labor Accountability AcL of 2017, H.R. 4703, 115th Cong. § 1. 
142. Department of Education Accountability and WhisLleblower Protection Act of 
2017, H.R. 4 702, 115th Cong. § l. 
143. Both bills have gained only four sponsors and cosponsors, and both bills have the 
same four representatives, Rep. Francis Rooney (R-FL), Rep. Lloyd Smucker (R-PA), 
Rep. Ralph Norman (R-SC), and Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-1'~L). Rep. Smucker introduced 
the Labor Oepi. bill and Rep. Rooney introduced the Ed. Dept. bill. Both Bills were 
referred to committee on December 20, 2017 and have had no further action taken. 
H.R. 4702- Department of Education Accountability and Whi.~tleblower Protection 
Act, CONGRESS.GOV, h tips://www .congress.gov/bill/I 15th-congrcss/house-bill/4 7021 
(last visited Sept. 30, 2018); H.R. 4703 - Department of Labor Accountability Act of 
2017, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bilJ/l l5th-congress/house-
biU/47031(1ast visited Sept. 30, 2018). 
144. Exec. Order No. 13839, 83 Fed. Reg. 25, 343 (June 1, 2018). 
145. See, e.g. Lett.er from Sen. Tammy Duckworth, U.S. Senate to Sec'y David Shulkin, 
Oep't of Veterans Affairs (Feb. 13, 2018), 
hLtps://www.duckworLh.senate.gov/imolmedia/dod2018.02. l3%20-
%20Letter%20to%20Sec.%20Shull<ln%20rc%20VA%20Accountability%20&%20Whist 
lcblower . ... pdf. 
146. Id. 
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mJury, or for missing a deadline.147 A June letter was sent to 
Missal, stating that the VA was not reporting to Congress about 
the implementation of the Accountability Act, and that Senators 
on the Committee on Veterans' Affairs were receiving reports that 
the law was being used in an inconsistent and inappropriate 
manner. 148 House Representative Brian Fitzpatrick introduced a 
bill in the House of Representatives on June 14, 2018 that would 
repeal parts of the Accountability Act and make VA employees 
again subject to the same removal, demotion, and suspension 
policies as other employees of the Federal Government. 149 If the 
Accountability Act continues to fail, and to gain bipartisan 
opposition, removing the Act through the legislature would be the 
best way to restore worker's rights in the VA. 
It is unlikely that the Accountability Act will be seen by a 
court to determine its constitutionality. Federal employees have 
to appeal the agency decision to the MSPB and to the Federal 
Circuit Court. The Federal Circuit Court is primarily a patent 
court and is ill-suited to deal with employee due process claims. 150 
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit shows substantial deference to 
the MSPB decision, overturning only a small portion of MSPB 
decisions. 15t With a lower standard of evidence specified by the 
147. Letter from Sen. Jon '!'ester et. al, US Senate to Sec'y David Shulkin, Dep't of 
Veterans Affairs (Feb. 26, 2018), 
h ttps://admin.govexec.com/media/gbc/ docs/pdfs_cdi t/03 l 3 l 8valetter. pdf. 
148. Letter from Sen. Jon Tester et. al, US Senate to MichaelJ. Missal, Inspector Gen. 
at the Dep't of Veterans Affairs (Jun. 15, 2018), 
hUps://www.veterans.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2018-06-
15%20Accountability%20and%20Whist1ehlower%20Protection%20Act.pdf. 
14.9. Gov'l'RACK, 11.R.6/01(11511•): VA Personnel Equity Act of 2018, 
hUps://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/hr6lOl (last visited ,Jan. 25, 2019); See also 
Gov'l'RACI<, H. R. 6101: VA Personnel Equity Act of 2018, 
https://www.govLrack.us/congress/bilJs/ll5/hr6101/details (lasL visited Jan. 25, 2019). 
150. AL the end of 2017, Lhe T<'ederal Circuit had 61 currently pending MSPB appeals 
before it, 6 pending appeals from the Department of Veterans Affairs, 639 pending 
appeals from the Patent and Trademark Oflice, anrl 524 pending patent appeals from 
the District Courts. The Federal Circuit had 1,578 cases currently pending, wiLh more 
than 6 in 10 cases being relaLed Lo patents. U.S. C1'. OF AJ'PEALS !•'OR THE F ED. CIR., 
Year-to-Date Activity as of December 3 I, 2017, 
http://www.ca fc. uscourts. gov/sites/ defa u l t/fi les/the-cou rt/stat is tics/Y'fD-Activity • 
December-2017.pdf; The total appeals filed are a little more promising, but not by 
much. Patent and trademark cases make up approximately 65% of appeals filed in the 
Federal Circuit, MSPB and personnel management appeals make up 11% of the filed 
cases. U.S. •I'. OP APPEALS !'OR THE FED. CIR., Appeals Filed, by Category FY 2017, 
http://www.ca fc. u scou rts. gov/sites/ defa u I t/fi I es/the-
court/ s ta Listics/ FY_l 7 _Fil ings_by _Category. pdf. 
151. Only 9% of MSPB cases were reversed by Federal Circuit judges in Lhe twelve• 
month period ending on September 30, 2017. U.S CT. or APPEALS f'Of< THI!: FED. CIR., 
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Accountability Act, even more deference may be given to the 
MSPB decision, and thus the Agency decision. After a review of 
Federal Circuit case law dealing with federal employee due 
process, decisions in favor of employees claiming to lack due 
process in federal employment decisions are generally found when 
ex parte communication has occurred between the proposing 
official and the deciding official. 152 
The chances are slim that the Accountability Act will even be 
heard by the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme 
Court has between 7,000 and 8,000 cases filed each year, but 
historically only takes on approximately 80 cases each year. 153 
This number has fallen in recent years, with the Supreme Court 
hearing only 71 cases in the 2014 term 154, and only 70 cases in the 
2016 term155, the lowest numbers since World War II. 156 It would 
be unexpected for the Supreme Court to review a case regarding 
the Accountability Act, and should not be counted on in efforts to 
Table B-8 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit - ,Appeals Filed, Terminated, 
and Pending Dur1:11g the Twelve-Month Period Ended September 30, 201 7, 
http://www.caf c. 11scou1·ts.gov/si tcs/def au I t/files/lhc-
cou l'l'I A ppea hs_ Pi lcd_ 'I'e1·minatcd_Pcntling_20J 7.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2019). 'l'hc 
l.wo prior years 2016 and 2016 have 6% and 4%, res_pcctively, ofMSPB cases l'Oversed 
by the Federal Cil-cuit. u.s CT. QI> /\Pl'l'J\~ FOR 1'HE Prm. Cm .. '/'able 13-8 U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the l'i'edcral Circuit - Appeals Filed, 'l'crminated. a1td Pe1tdin,: During the 
'l~uelve-Month Period g,ufed Septembel' 30. 2015, 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/iiles/the-
court/statistics/appeals_filed_terminated_and_pending.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 
2019); U.S CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. Cm., 'foble lJ-8 U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit - J\pf)C!als Filed, Terminatad, a11d PencUng During the 7'welue-Month 
Peri.od Ended September 30, 2016, http://www.cafc.uscourt.s.gov/sites/defau 1 t/fi!es/the-
court/statistics/FY16_Appeals_Filed_'l'erminated_and_Pending_2.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 25, 2019). 
152. See Young v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 706 F.3d 1372, 
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repeal the Act.157 Even if the Supreme Court were to review the 
Accountability Act- and until this happens- federal employees 
will continue to be improperly and unconstitutionally removed 
from their jobs and losing their livelihood. 
VI. REAL PlJRPOSE OF THE ACT 
The Accountability Act changes many terms of public 
employment at the VA, but the Act does not fundamentally 
change the reasoning used to fixe workers with petforma nce 
issues or workers who have committed crimes; the law only affects 
the time periods and standards of review. Over 500 VA employees 
were fired between January 20, 2017, and July 7, 2017.158 This 
is, on average, 100 firings per month. Between January 20, 2017 
and December 31, 2017, the VA removed 1,440 employees, 
averaging 140 removals per month. Across the entire federal 
government, 77,000 full time employees were removed between 
2000 and 2014, averaging 5,000 per year.159 Bad employees were 
already being fired before this Accountability Act was passed, but 
those employees retained their due process rights. 
The Accountability Act instead is both a push for a 
privatization of veteran care and a push to bust public sector 
unions. Over 49,000 job positions are open at the VA across the 
nation, and the failure to fill these empty positions has caused 
protests outside of the VA hospitals with demands that these 
positions be filled.160 An internal memorandum sent on April 14, 
157. Interestingly, in 2016, a case involving the MSPB was appealed Lo the Supremo 
Court, ruul the cow-t sided with the employee. /Je,-ry v. MS JJB involved a question of 
appellate procedure, specifically if federal em1>loyees could fil e o discrimination claim 
in federal district court, even if LhaL same claim was dismissed by Lhe MSPB for lack 
of jurisdiction. The court found in favor of the employee on a 7-2 basis (Justices 
Gorsuch and Thomas dissenting). Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 137 S.Ct. 
1975 (2017). 
158. While the Accountability Act was signed into law on June 14, 2017, the Act 
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estimate of 1·emovals unde1· the old system. DEPT. OF V1,;TERANS /\FF., Accountabilit.Y 
Ueport (Feb. 7, 2018). 
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2017 from former Secretary Shulkin, was obtained by the 
Associated Press. 161 In that memorandum, Shulkin stated that 
the VA will become leaner and that the VA will adopt a long-term 
plan to outsource veteran health needs to private hospitals.162 
This memo implies that these positions will never be filled. t63 
However, former Secretary Shulkin claims that he was fired from 
the VA for being opposed to privatization. 164 
This Act is also a union-busting bill in disguise. The 
Accountability Act has certain clauses that state it directly 
overrules any existing collective bargaining agreement between 
unions and the federal government, and forces unions to follow 
the same time periods in any grievances.165 The largest union 
that represents VA employees is the American Federation of 
Government Employees (AFGE), and they have been loudly 
outspoken over the affects this act will have on employees, the VA, 
and the union itself. t66 The President of the AFG E, J. David Cox 
Sr., stated in testimony before the Senate Veterans Affairs 
Committee, that the Act "decreases accountability at the VA, it 
eviscerates the agency it is supposed to improve, and ensures that 
no employee ever gets a fair shake on any proposed adverse 
action".167 Cox went on to explain that the VA's true problem is 
the severe shortage of employees working, leading to long hours 
and increased burn out.168 
FE0ERALSOUP (Sep. 08, 2017), https://fedetalsoup.com/articles/2017/09/08/va-
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All of these secondary purposes of the Accountability Act are 
similar to the "starve the beast" strategy embraced by modern 
conservatives. First taxes are cut, and then once the money 
coming into the federal government has dried up, programs are 
cut in an effort to balance the budget.169 This idea is summarized 
by Grover Norquist, President of the Americans for Tax Reform, 
who stated "I don't want to abolish government. I simply want to 
reduce it to the size where I can drag it into the bathroom and 
drown it in the bathtub."170 In the recent changes at the VA, 
employees are being cut to levels inadequate to staff facilities, and 
the quality of service has declined. m This drop in quality of 
service is brought forward by the news media, and in response, 
politicians make further changes that only harm workers. At this 
rate, the obvious next step will be to cut the VA itself to make the 
system ''leaner" and more reliant on private sector health 
services. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This new law is unjust to workers, misguided in scope and 
purpose, and is ultimately unconstitutional. A federal employee 
that has just cause job protection has a property right to their job. 
The Fifth Amendment states that the federal government cannot 
take property away from an individual without due process. Due 
process requires that an individual receive notice, have an 
opportunity to respond, and be allowed an appeal to a neutral 
third party. The reasonableness of procedures performed 
whenever the government is taking property away from an 
individual is evaluated under Matthews v. Eldridge. The 
Accountability Act fails the Matthews u. Eldridge balancing test, 
making any removal of a federal employee since the enactment of 
this law a violation of due process. There is Uttle judicial 
opportunity to strike this act as unconstitutional. It is unclear if 
workers' constitutionally protected rights will be reinstated, and 
it is unlikely that any of the already removed workers will be 
made whole. However, there is rising political distaste toward the 
Accountability Act, and the most prudent way to remove this law 
is to repeal it through legislative processes. 
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